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In July 2004, General Anatoly Kvashnin - number two in the Russian military hierarchy - 
was dismissed as Chief of Russias all-powerful General Staff after seven years of 
holding the job. The ouster ended a public brawl between Kvashnin and his immediate 
superior Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, appointed by President Vladimir Putin in 2001.
 
Before taking on Ivanov, Kvashnin publicly locked horns with the previous Defense 
Minister (1997-2001) Marshal Igor Sergeyev and eventually succeeded in ousting him. 
During his tenure, Kvashnin often made reckless public statements. In June 2003, 
Kvashnin surprised the nation by announcing publicly that the Russian military was in a 
"post-critical state" and had degraded into a rabble of thieves and crooks.
 
Constant infighting between Kvashnin and two successive Defense Ministers from 1997 
to 2004 virtually paralyzed the Defense Ministry. Administrative reforms were 
announced and executed only to be redone later. In 1998, the Space Forces that 
conduct space launches were merged with the Strategic Rocket Forces. Several years 
later, after Sergeyev was ousted, the merger was called off and the Space Forces were 
reinstated. Kvashnin in turn dissolved the Ground Forces (Army) High Command to 
subordinate all army units directly to the General Staff. In several years the measure 
was recognized as a serious mistake and the Army High Command was recreated.
 
In 2000, Putin appointed Kvashnin a full member of the Russian Security Council (a 
position no previous Chief of the General Staff ever occupied). However, the 
concentration of power in the hands of the Chief of the General Staff and the favors 
heaped on him, created a serious opposition within Putin's inner circle, of whom Ivanov 
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was a member and Kvashnin was not. The fracas between the supreme chiefs of our 
military also facilitated a public debate about the organizational composition of our 
Defense Ministry and possible future changes in the line of command and the 
distribution of responsibilities.
 
In June 2004, the Russian Duma passed changes to the Law on Defense that the 
Kremlin had introduced in April 2004. The bill sailed though without any serious debate, 
was approved by the upper house - the Federation Council - and signed into law by 
Putin.
 
On paper, the bill profoundly changed the organization of the Russian military. In the 
new version of the Law on Defense, all references were removed about the role of the 
General Staff. The Defense Minister and the Defense Ministry, according to the law, 
were in command of the Armed Forces, without the General Staff being singled out as 
"the main operational executive body" in military matters.
 
At the time, many observers interpreted the change of text as an indicator that the long 
personal feud between Ivanov and Kvashnin had ended with Ivanov's victory, which was 
an accurate assessment. Kvashnin was soon ousted and sent to Siberia, as Putin's 
official representative in the region. The revision of the law was also seen as a decisive 
break with the past, as the beginning of a genuine pro-Western transformation of the 
Russian military.
 
There was much talk of a profound contraction of responsibilities of the General Staff 
after Kvashnin's ouster and of a "strengthening" of the role of the Defense Ministry. On 
June 19, commenting on the dismissal of Kvashnin and the appointment of his 
successor - General Yuri Baluyevsky - as Chief of the General Staff, Ivanov told 
journalists: "Putin and I believe that the General Staff must concentrate on long-term 
planning of the future development of the Armed Forces and the modeling of the wars of 
the future, while working less on current matters in the units and crisis managing."
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In May 2004, in the annual address to a joint session of both chambers of parliament, 
Putin not only talked of "modernization of the army" being a national priority, but also 
specifically mentioned "civil control" of defense spending as essential to reform. Putin's 
pronouncements strongly indicated a serious change in our military, since meaningful 
"civil control" is surely impossible, while an omnipotent General Staff continues to be in 
charge.
 
Were Putin and Ivanov serious, when calling for reform? Today, over a year later in 
October 2005, it's clear that it was all just talk, that a personality clash between Ivanov 
and Kvashnin masqueraded as something more serious.
 
Since Kvashnin's ouster, there have been no genuine changes within the Defense 
Ministry or in the way it and other so-called "power structures" or militarized government 
agencies do their business. On the day of Kvashnin's ouster (July 19, 2004) at a 
session of the Security Council, Putin announced publicly: "We have made a serious 
decision to create a joint logistic support system." Ivanov replied to the President that 
the implementation of this reform is fully underway. More than a year passed, but the 
much talked about joint system of logistic support (tylovoye obespechenye) to serve all 
Russia's parallel armies and "power" agencies have not been created.
 
General Baluyevsky has been in charge of the Main Operational Directorate of the 
General Staff since 1996. (Baluyevsky was moved to Moscow from Tbilisi in 1996 from 
the position of chief of staff of our troops in Transcaucasia.) The Main Operational 
Directorate is the core structure of the General Staff that is in direct on line command of 
the strategic nuclear deterrent and operationally controls the entire Armed Forces of 
Russia. During a crisis, the President, the Defense Minister, and the Chief of the 
General Staff may connect to the Central Command Post of the Main Operational 
Directorate to pass on orders, using their nuclear footballs or "nuclear briefcases," as 
they are known in Russia. But it's the Main Operational Directorate and its chief that 
formulate the scope and direction of any nuclear launch. The Main Operational 
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Directorate and its Central Command Post can authorize a nuclear launch if any or all of 
the three nuclear football keepers are unavailable.
 
In 2001, Baluyevsky became Kvashnin's deputy, while retaining control of the Main 
Operational Directorate. Baluyevsky is a much less ambitious person than Kvashnin 
and at the same time, a much better military top staff professional. During the years that 
Baluyevsky was Kvashnin's number two in the General Staff, he was running the entire 
outfit, while Kvashnin was involved in intrigue, in personal showoffs and occasional 
binge drinking. (Baluyevsky, as well as Ivanov, according to overall Russian standards 
of general officer alcohol consumption, may be called teetotalers).
 
Baluyevsky's lack of ambition has made his relations with Ivanov much smoother than 
Kvashnin could ever manage. For more than a year there have been no public spats 
between the General Staff and the Minister. At the same time, Baluyevsky's professional 
and organizational capabilities have in fact accelerated the role of the General Staff in 
decision-making. For example, during the arduous negotiations with the Chinese 
military over joint exercises that eventually took place in Aug. 2005 on the shore of 
Tsingtao peninsula south-west of Beijing, and during the actual execution of the 
maneuvers, Baluyevsky was visibly at the helm, while Ivanov appeared on the scene 
briefly as the blabbing figurehead - that in fact he is.
 
Since Baluyevsky was in fact running the General Staff under Kvashnin, it would be 
unreasonable to expect that policies and procedure would change dramatically, when 
after many years of working the show behind the scenes, a person finally becomes 
number one and officially in charge. The Law on Defense was rewritten and direct 
references depicting the role of the General Staff were dropped, but in real life, this did 
not change much. In Russia, laws passed by parliament are never of much importance. 
The ruling bureaucracy interprets the laws and issues its own executive ordinances on 
how they should be implemented. Parliament does not have any power to control how 
laws are interpreted or implemented, it cannot censure any minister, and it does not 
have the power to subpoena any executive official to give evidence under oath.
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As for the General Staff, the powers that were presumably withdrawn from it by the 
change or law, in real life have been fully retained: The General Staff is still officially - 
"the central body of military command and the main body of operational command of the 
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation." The General Staff prepares and constantly 
modifies our true military doctrine - the Operational Plan (Plan Primenenya) of the 
Armed Forces, including the forces of the parallel armies. The General Staff commands 
all of the Armed Forces in time of war. Instead of a law, all these functions are legalized 
by presidential decree (ukaz).
 
Talk of military reform began in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, but before the 
demise of the U.S.S.R no comprehensive reform plans were adapted. Despite 
overwhelming global changes, the Soviet (Russian) military chiefs were only reacting to 
events—withdrawing weapons and troops—as first the Warsaw pact and then the 
Soviet Union fell apart.
 
In Soviet times, the Communist Party controlled the military politically, through political 
officers and KGB agents that infested the ranks to see that no armed revolt happened. 
At the same time, the Defense Ministry was a uniform military organization, autonomous 
in most internal matters, without any civilians or "civil control."
 
In September 1991, Chief of the General Staff General Vladimir Lobov proposed to split 
the Defense Ministry into civilian and military organizations, but Defense Minister Air 
Marshal Evgeni Shaposhnikov squashed the idea and Lobov was ousted. After the 
demise of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yel'tsin was pressed to appoint a genuine 
civilian as Defense Minister, but balked at the idea to have a fellow politician with 
political ambitions in charge of the Russian (Soviet) military machine. General Igor 
Rodionov was retired in 1996 to pose for several months as a "civilian Defense 
Minister," former KGB General Ivanov is today playing the same role, but the Soviet 
structure of the Defense Ministry, and General Staff have been preserved since 1991 
without much change.
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Russia has a Prussian-style all-powerful General Staff that controls all the different 
armed services and is more or less independent of outside political constraints. Russian 
military intelligence - GRU, as big in size as the former KGB and spread over all 
continents - is an integral part of the General Staff. Through GRU, the General Staff 
controls the supply of vital information to all other decision-makers in all matters 
concerning defense procurement planning, threat assessment and so on. High-ranking 
former GRU officers have told me that in Soviet times the General Staff used the GRU 
to grossly, deliberately and constantly mislead the Kremlin about the magnitude and 
gravity of the military threat posed by the West in order to help inflate military 
expenditure. There are serious indications that at present the same foul practice is 
continuing.
 
Before the grip of the General Staff can be removed, an alternative system of command 
and control should be established. For the "Defense Ministry" to be in charge without 
the General Staff, one first needs to have a ministry. At present, the Russian Defense 
Ministry is a typical military hierarchical command structure with all lines of command 
going through the General Staff.
 
I spent lots of time within the lobbies and top offices of our General Staff and Defense 
Ministry in the first half of the 1990s and could see the internal operations at first hand. 
To begin with, the Russian Defense Ministry, which today has over 2 million people on 
its payroll, does not have a separate office building of its own. The Defense Minister, his 
deputy and their personal staffs occupy relatively small offices on the fifth flour of the 
main building of the General Staff complex. Our "Defense Ministry" is, in essence, the 
board of directors of a great corporation and its brand name - while the General Staff is 
the true corporate headquarters with the Chief of the General Staff playing the role of 
chief executive vice president.
 
The Russian/Soviet top military administration has demonstrated remarkable 
consistency in structure, procedure and strategic intentions during periods of unusual 
change in Russia, and the total dominance of the General Staff in decision making has 
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been preserved the whole time. This has provided stability and continuity of command 
within our military. All major players seem, at present, to be content to keep it as it is: 
The military chiefs mind their own affairs without much control and do not in any way 
threaten the Kremlin, while staying busy misappropriating tens of billions of petrodollars 
that are being pumped into the defense budget.
 
In many public speeches Putin and Ivanov called for the creation of a more compact, 
well-armed, modern military. At the same time, our high brass still insists upon 
sustaining a mass mobilization armed force with relatively cheap, mass-produced tanks 
and guns. The legacy of World War II is still considered, in our military academies, as 
the finest of modern military tactics, operational art and strategy. Suggestions that 
drastically would cut numbers in exchange for increasing quality are dismissed as pro-
Western diversions that are intended to "disarm Russia" in the event of an imminent 
U.S.-lead NATO invasion.
 
The end result is a "strategic compromise" that merges irreconcilable patterns of military  
planning and development. Russia is trying at the same time to have a Soviet-type 
mass army of conscripts and reservists, while at the same time attempting to assemble 
hundreds of contract solders to form new professional units. As a result, Putin and 
Ivanov get the worst of both: An old Soviet-type armed force with a Soviet command 
structure that is continuing to decompose, and in essence, has lost the ability to fight the 
"big wars" it was built to fight. Any mass mobilization is now a dream, since the 
reservists are not trained and the heavy weapons in the storage bases are old and 
mostly dysfunctional. The "permanent readiness" units are also equipped with the same 
old weapons and inadequately trained.
 
Deputy Defense Minister General Alexander Belousov told journalists in September 
2005 that 70 percent of contract soldiers recruited today are in fact conscripts that sign 
on after half a year of conscript service. The forced redressing of conscripts into 
"volunteer contract solders and sergeants" is a typical Putinite Potemkin village-style 
reform that will cost the budget billions, while not solving any real problems. In 
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November 2004, Ivanov announced at a meeting of our top brass that in 2004 only 64 
percent of the "permanent readiness units" were ready for action (in 2003 the figure was 
62 percent). "The fighting potential of our permanent readiness units does not allow 
them to act rapidly to contain any local conflict or emergency situation in any potential 
strategic theater," reported Ivanov.
 
Attempts at military reform from 1991 until 2005 did not produce tangible results. After 
the collapse of Communism, the General Staff did its best to keep as much of the Soviet 
structures and armaments alive as possible, waiting for an obvious strategic enemy to 
appear that would unite the nation, increase defense spending and social support for 
the military. The Soviet principle of perimeter defense against all the rest of the world 
survived, while Russia's foreign policy and defense aspirations continued to be out of 
line with available resources. Within the Russian military something is constantly 
changing, but the basics do not seem to change at all.
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